Thursday, May 19, 2011

THE ARMY'S GUN OIL CALLED CLP DOES NOT WORK PROPERLY AND Why Are Folks Hired That Are Not Needed?

 The email (below-2 days ago) is a perfect example what happens to weapons when the army's three in one combustible lubricant is used.
The manager of the 149 degree minimum flash point specification should be jailed. It does not take a rocket scientist to realize that an oil with a 149 degree flash point should not be used on weapons where the ambient temps on the gun metal will surpass the flash point of the gun oil.
THE PICATINNY ARSENAL MOB DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT A WEAPON IS ONLY AS EFFECTIVE AS THE APPLIED LUBRICANT.
This is why tanks and planes use synthetic oils because of temperature extremes. For the army to mandate a combustible oil for all military weapons world wide is criminal. So instead of locking folks up, weapons are jamming and the do-nothing mob in NJ is in constant demand because the guns do not work properly... all because of a defective oil that keeps many employed because of the constant problems.This is why no one makes or sells the army's 3 in one oil. Normally military technology is state of the art and everyone wants to use the technology. Then why did the original manufacturer of the governments oil stop making it? Answer, because it was proven in OEF/OIF not to work properly and all of the reports confirm this. So the army's answer is to now OVER LUBE weapons in a desert environment. Why was this change made after 15 years? Because of one indoor test that demonstrated over lubing with an artificial sand was more effective that under lubing. So why would the army adopt this new procedure. when the reports have disclaimers? Answer, to maintain the status quo, which is a danger since nothing changes and the rascals stay in power, even though they are not needed.
----- Original Message -----
From: "xxxxx" <xxxx.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 11:01 AM
Subject: 1stBN 5thMAR Advisor Team in Afghanistan

> Hello my name is Sgt xxxx
>     I'm in Sangin Afghanistan advising and patroling with the Afghan
> National Army. We're danger low on CLP, plus the stuff we do have just
> attracts the dust and turns to sludge. We have 20 guys total, we'll
> take whatever you can afford to give!
>
> MAIL TO:
>
> Sgt xxx
> 1/5 H&S Co. Advisor Team
> UNIT 40315 FPO AP xxxx
>
>
> -Thanks for the support!
>
> Sgt xxxx
> SEMPER FI
>

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

WHY CAN'T THOUSANDS OF SCIENTISTS DEVELOP PRODUCTS?

 The army pays thousands of scientist (and others) big bucks to develop needed gear for the warfighters. Then why for the past ten years has their been no significant advances in gear? Why does the army pay scientists when they don't invent anything? Is it because the scientists may have a breakthrough in the future?
Why does the army spends billions on programs at Picatinny Arsenal in NJ? Picatinny did develop the Picatinny rail for guns. What else has Picatinny developed that reached the warfighter in the past 10 years? If Picatinny was run for profit, the based would be shuttered since they is nothing to show.
If the army would embrace competition, they would not have to rely on their own people whom (most) place their careers above the needs of the warfighter. Over half of deployed troops are not issued all of the basic supplies prior to their departure.PEO Soldier and Picatinny should be held to account. Why does Picatinny support a 149 degree flashpoint lubricant (called CLP) for world-wide military operations? Answer, because they can and will not admit (by changing spec) that jammed weapons are responsible for dead troops.
If PEO Soldier worked as it was supposed too, MILITEC-1 would not be in constant demand by Soldiers and the army's combustible gun oil would not be jamming weapons in sustained gun fights.  The army has created a bureaucracy that feeds off itself and is unable to address the immediate needs of soldiers going into combat.
Since the system is designed by default to defend itself, most troops will continue to go into battle without the proper supplies needed, until fair and honest competition is allowed. The military civilians maintain their power by controlling and/or elininating competition through various in house programs.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bradley P. Giordani" <militec@militec-1.com>
To: "Allen D Westheimer" <WestheimerA@gao.gov>; "Colin L Chambers" <ChambersC@GAO.GOV>; "Oscar W Mardis" <MardisO@GAO.GOV>; "Marilyn K Wasleski" <WasleskiM@GAO.GOV>
Cc: "lee kind" <lee.kind@militec.com>; "Richard Feeney" <Rick1655@aol.com>; "Russ Logan" <militec@militec-1.com>
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2008 2:43 PM
Subject: THE PROBLEM WITHIN THE ARMY

>I found an article (on body armor) in Defense review @
> http://www.defensereview.com/article828.html that I believe highlights a
> similar problem we have with the system.
>
> Pasted below(from the link above), is a paragraph that highlights the
> problems (we are having) at Picatinny Arsenal, JSSAP and AMC.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> The problem is that the best current small arms solutions are being actively
> blocked by DoD/U.S. Army elements that control the small arms
> procurement/adoption system. This system is broken and corrupt. Elements
> within U.S. Army Materiel Command, and Picatinny Arsenal/JSSAP appear to be
> more concerned with their own careers and survival than the lives/survival
> of our infantry warfighters (our guys on the ground doing the actual
> fighting). The current small arms development and procurement/adoption
> system isn't just broken. It's terminally broken, and needs to be completely
> overhauled. To DefenseReview's knowledge, Picatinny Arsenal/JSSAP hasn't
> developed and successfully fielded a single infantry small arm since
> Picatinny took over military small arms procurement/adoption after the old
> Springfield Armory (U.S. Army, not private company currently operating in
> Illinois) was rased to the ground over 40 years ago. Picatinny Arsenal/JSSAP
> unfortunately hasn't proven itself to be any more effective than the old
> Springfield Armory, and our infantry warfighters are suffering for it.
> Unfortunately, like any organism, the current system will fight tooth and
> nail to defend itself in order to live on. But, make no mistake, it needs to
> be killed, just like the old Springfield Armory (U.S. Army's Springfield
> Armory, not the current private company in Illinois) before it.
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I hope this article helps !
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Brad P. Giordani
> http://www.militec-1.com/
>
>

Thursday, May 5, 2011

CORPORATE CONTROL OVER THE ARMY

 
----- Original Message -----
Cc: 
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2008 9:40 AM
Subject: CORPORATE CONTROL OVER THE ARMY

1. Its been a long standing tradition for the Association of the US Army (AUSA) ("the voice of the soldier") to  hire only  former Commanding General's of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) to be the President of the AUSA.
 
2. The corporate contractors rely on AUSA to get their word out to  Army buyers. AUSA lobbies Congress on behalf of Army issues. 
 
3. The Corporate control  AUSA  has over AMC is cemented by their hiring of  Commanding General's fresh out of AMC.
 
4. This is why AMC fights tooth-and-nail over any competition that does not originate through AMC channels.
 
5. This is also why the Cleaner Lubricant and Preservative (CLP) weapons lubricant has not had any competition (except for us briefly)  since it was developed twenty-eight years ago.
 
We are fighting this issue with all of our might because CLP does not work in desert combat environments and AMC cannot admit after twenty-eight years that this program has been a failure.  Next to food and water there is nothing more important for combat troops than to have weapons that work first time and every time. This is a National Security Issue.
 
We have been attacked by MG. Roger A. Nadeau for exposing a defective product that AMC still considers to this day to be state-of-the-art in lubrication performance.
 
We cannot keep supplying the entire Military without our NSN's being valid in the supply system.
 
We are deeply in debt and hope that some oversight can help us stay in business.
 
Sincerely,
 
Brad P. Giordani
 
 
 

WE ARE HOPEFUL THE NEW CHAIRMAN WILL INVESTIGATE ABUSE

 
----- Original Message -----
Cc: 
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 11:36 AM
Subject: BACKGROUND INFO

11828 Pika Drive, Waldorf, Maryland 20602 USA
Phone (301) 893-3910   Fax: (301) 893-8354

May 3, 2007



Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your demonstrated interest in questionable government procurement policies and in bureaucratic irregularities and misconduct leads us to believe that you will share our concerns about an agency within the U.S. Army and the effect of its actions.

At issue is whether American troops in the field should be permitted to procure and use a weapons lubricant of their choice – be mindful that properly functioning weapons are literally our troops’ lifelines.

The Army asserts adamantly that its approved product is the “perfect” lubricant, but the troops overwhelmingly, aggressively, reject it.  Ironically, the troops’ lubricant of choice – MILITEC-1 – is mandated for use by almost all other federal agencies, including the Secret Service, Coast Guard, Capitol Police, Park Police, and many more.

The Army developed its lubricant – CLP (Cleaner, Lubricant, and Preservative) – in 1980, and has upgraded the specifications and formula many times in an attempt to get it to work.  Any weapons lubricant must conform to the Military Specification (MilSpec) for CLP in order to be approved by the Army.

The problem lies in the fact that the MilSpec for CLP calls for a “wet” lubricant that functions by keeping a liquid film of oil on metal surfaces at all times.  In the Iraqi and Afghan deserts, this spells disaster, because the oil film attracts dust and sand, forming a sludge that renders weapons inoperable.  It also promotes a build-up of carbon and metal particles that result from firing the weapons.

In contrast, MILITEC-1 is a “dry” lubricant – synthetic oil that actually becomes a part of metal surfaces instead of covering them with a liquid film.  It allows a dry, fully lubricated, corrosion- resistant weapon to operate without attracting sand and dust, or attracting even the usual carbon and metallic debris created by firing the weapon.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, weapons lubricated with MILITEC-1 continue to fire in conditions that quickly jam a weapon lubricated with CLP.



We have thousands of unsolicited emails and personal testimonials – far more than mere “anecdotal evidence” – from troops in Iraq and throughout the world who ridicule CLP, while attesting to the life-saving properties of MILITEC-1.

From 2002 through 2005, Militec, Inc. filled four million dollars worth of orders and reorders for product to military field units, through the Defense logistics Agency (DLA).  However, in 2005, the Army precipitously cancelled the National Stock Numbers assigned to MILITEC-1, preventing further DLA fulfillment of orders from the field.  This cancellation has also prevented DLA fulfillment of orders for MILITEC-1 from other government agencies such as Secret Service, Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard.

Now, when field units order MILITEC-1, they are shipped CLP instead – the same CLP the units were trying to avoid because they consider it dangerous to use.

Let us be clear: MILITEC-1 will not conform to a MilSpec.  It does not function as the Army’s MilSpec-defined CLP.  To argue how well MILITEC-1 meets or does not meet a MilSpec is specious, and only distracts from the key issue:  that the dry lubricant, MILITEC-1, functions very well in the field, and the Army-approved wet lubricant, CLP, does not.

Mr. Chairman, the history of this issue has generated controversy and disagreement, but the stakes today are too high to coddle bruised egos.  Army MilSpec defenders can’t be allowed simply to say, “We’re right because we’re right,” while troops in the field, from privates through senior NCO’s to general officers, say, “They’re wrong!” ... not when the price of error can be lethal.

Our troops deserve the right to procure and use a weapons lubricant that their hard experience has shown them will work, where CLP does not.  And their morale is diminished when they see their judgment based on experience is ignored.  Therefore, in addition to the MILITEC-1delivered to military units through DLA, this company has, since 2001, shipped directly to individual troops and units more than 329,000 bottles of MILITEC-1.  We do not accept any payment for these shipments, not from the troops or their families, and we absorb the cost of shipment through the Postal Service and UPS.

The issue of allowing field units to choose MILITEC-1 carries an extensive paper trail extending more than 15 years.  Militec, Inc., has maintained that paper trail very carefully; we invite you and your staff to examine it.  We believe you will find astounding degrees to which certain elements in the Army have gone to prevent field units from obtaining what their experience has shown to be the superior weapons lubricant.

If you will give us the time for a careful, studied review, we believe you will see an issue easily valid enough to rise to the level of your committee’s attention.

Sincerely,



Richard J. Feeney
Vice President for Public Affairs

Why the Army Cannot Modernize Quickly

 The Army must understand that one show does not fit all as it may have in Vietnam.
----- Original Message -----
Cc: 
Sent: Monday, October 06, 2008 12:47 PM
Subject: THIS WAS PROVIDED TO HASC OVER THE SUMMER

        Why the Army Cannot Modernize Quickly

·        Before being procured by the Army, every piece of hardware fielded to Soldiers goes through seven distinct development stages, all controlled by statute and regulation.
·        These stages of development are not transparent.  The machinations performed by Army staff, even if not classified, are largely hidden.  Therefore, if contractors and other interested parties are to stay current with the development process, they must build solid relationships with each of the bureaucrats who are in charge of the seven different stages of development.  This multi-tiered system ensures that Army-developed products are protected from cradle to grave. Industrial and commercially approved products are not given a chance to compete in DoD commodity markets.
·        Early in the development cycle, the “customers” are officers within the Joint Chiefs of Staff who vet each weapon system to ensure the requirement is valid.  Later, the combat developer agencies are seen as the customers.  Then the materiel developer community becomes the customer.  Eventually, the soldier is the end-user.  This multi-tiered system, with changing personalities of the many decision makers, makes it difficult for companies to compete for any Army business when civil servants must protect their jobs at all cost. 
·        Since Vietnam, nearly all Army equipment has been replaced with more modern equipment, incrementally better items except -- most importantly -- small arms, third in importance to the soldier, behind water and rations. The Joint Services Small Arms Program (JSSAP) manages all small arms programs for the DoD. For their 20 plus year existence, JSSAP has never put in the hands of warfighters any new weapon systems.
Well-intended, but Inadequate “Fixes”
·        Commercial off the Self (COTS) products are used by the General Service Administration and other federal agencies, except for the military.  Why? The military uses its own people to develop and implement new products, instead of buying off the self. Commodities should be competitively bid.
·        The Defense Streamlining Acquisition Act was signed into Law in 1995, but still has not been implemented.  The Act was written to take advantage of COTS, and to encourage Commanders to think outside the strict MilSpec conformance box when general supplies are needed quickly.

Therefore, the Department of Defense has not followed the intent of Congress, nor the statute.  Congress must hold the Department of Defense accountable to both the spirit and the letter of the Defense Streamlining Acquisition Act.

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON MILITEC-1 DISCOUNTED AND TWO EMAILS FROM TODAY

The document was sent to the House Armmed Services Committee. Unfortunetly, Jesse Tolleson was not able to help. Jesse had the solution when he asked the army if a small bottle of MILITEC-1 could be madce available along with the army's CLP if units wanted to ordered it. The army's position is one bottle of the same product for all environments. The army has failed to realize that the minimum flash point for CLP is 149 degree F, which is extremely dangerous to use in hot environments. Weapons reach temteratures far beyond that of the CLP flashpoint. The other point the army fails to understand is a weapon is ONLY as effective as the applied lubricant. This is why tanks and jets use synthetic oils. A lubricant (army's own CLP) with a 149 degree specification should NEVER be used in a desert environment 

This is one of seveal reasons why the troops email us for help. Below, I  posted two emails from today:
   
From: XX, JXX M 1SG MIL USA USA B Co 1-201 USAxxxx [mailto:xxx.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2011 8:47 AM
To: militec@militec1.com
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO] deployed request for your product

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

I am the Company 1SG of a group currently deployed overseas. I have approx. 40 Soldiers currently in my location. Weapons, we have what I would call a “Standard Combat Load” as any Infantry Company would. I am requesting some of your product to distribute and utilize on our various platforms. As so many others before me have stated and as you know, MILTEC-1 hands down wins “the hearts and minds” of every Joe that has ever used it! Keep up the GREAT work! The support you give us is appreciated. To lighten the load on shipping and it helps with the OPSEC of the mission. If you can send it to my home (address below),. My wife sends packages to me about every other week with various supplies. Thanks again!

v/r

 1SGXXX

TF 1-201 Bravo Company First Sergeant


Mailing address, stateside

 XX Oh. XX
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2)-----Original Message-----
From: xxxx L SSG MIL USA USA XXX
[mailto:xxxxkuwait.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2011 8:08 AM
To: militec@militec1.com
Subject: militec for troops
Gentlemen,
I was overlooking the offer for free MILITEC for troops.  I have a total of 208 weapons systems from crew serves to personal weapons that I would like the dry lubricant for.  I think it is really awesome that your company does this for US Military personnel.  You can ship it to the shipping address below.  Thank you for your support.
 XX
SSG, FA, XXARNG
Supply NCO

TF 201st xx
xxx
Camp xxx, Kuwait
APO AE xxx
                                                                    

To: Jesse Tolleson, via email

From: Brad P. Giordani

SUBJ: Timeline document governing proper authority

Date June 25, 2007


This document will highlight the approvals and classifications for MILITEC-1’s National Stock Numbers (NSN’s) in the early nineties and how they were blocked 10 years later by RDECOM without obtaining the proper authority from the office at OSD which issued the directive back in 1995 for the issuance of additional NSN’s for MILITEC-1.

The NSN approvals of 1995 were a result of Congress and OSD reaching agreement on limiting the use of MILITEC-1 for weapons and machine shop applications. The Army’s former executive agent for fuels and lubes (Mr. LePera) even agreed on these two applications for MILITEC-1 which resulted in thousands of requisitions thru DSCR @ http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/data_pull_p1.html.

 The cancellation of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s and contracts began in earnest by ARDEC when both Commanders of RDECOM and AMC retired at the end of 2004. This campaign to rid MILITEC-1 from the system was done (1) despite the existing and daily demand for MILITEC-1 at DSCR, (2) pending ID/IQ five-year contract, and (3) over three million dollars that were rushed ordered by the Army in less than two years. DSCR finalized the acquisition plan http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/acquisition_plan_p1.html for a five-year ID/IQ contract award in February 2005.

Militec, Inc. contends that ARDEC, TACOM and RDECOM did not have the proper authority to block MILITEC-1 orders from Afghanistan and Iraq which circumvented the ten-year old 1995 agreement Congress had with OSD without complaint.

                                                                                      Timeline

 August 23, 1993: MILITEC-1 products are first granted five National Stock Numbers (NSN’s) by Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR), formerly DGSC. http://www.militec1.com/1nsn1.html

June 29, 1994: Memo titled “Specifications and Standards - A new way of doing business” is sent by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to his Under Secretaries. This became law in 1995, and Brad attended the Rose garden Ceremony.  http://www.militec1.com/NewWay1.html

August 26, 1994: Acting DSCR commander advises Militec, Inc. that removal of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s is in the Government’s best interest.  http://www.militec1.com/Lotts.html

October 31, 1994: Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), the parent agency of DSCR, advises Militec, Inc. that “all requisitions have been cancelled.” http://www.militec1.com/Lippert2.html

December 6, 1994: DLA advises Congress MILITEC-1’s NSN’s cancellation order as been suspended. http://www.militec.com/Montgomery2.html

March 17, 1995: Nineteen members of Congress send a joint letter to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry supporting MILITEC-1. http://www.militec1.com/Congress1.html

March 24, 1995: DLA advises Militec, Inc. that it will not cancel the NSN’s. http://www.militec1.com/Montgomery4.html

June 29, 1995: The Under Secretary of Defense sends Congress a letter stating, “Thank you for your letter of May 18, 1995, to Secretary Perry concerning MILITEC-l. I am pleased to inform you...” http://www.militec1.com/NSN1.html

July 6, 1995: DLA notifies Congress that two new National Stock Numbers (NSN’s) will be granted to MILITEC-1. http://www.militec1.com/FrankTejeda.html

September 18, 1995: MILITEC-1 is granted two additional NSN’s for a total of seven NSN’s through DLA. http://www.militec1.com/willfinkel1.html

For eight years, using our sole-sourced NSN’s, MILITEC-1 is continuously supplied to the Defense Supply Centers and Military units worldwide without a problem.

March 19, 2003: While our troops are rolling into Baghdad, MILITEC-1’s NSN’s are abruptly blocked by direction of Colonel Padgett at Picatinny Arsenal N.J (ARDEC). Colonel Padgett’s group also directs DSCR to cancel over $120,000.00 in emergency war orders for MILITEC-1, without notifying the Commanders of all three Brigades of the 3rd ID that were arriving in theater. http://www.militec1.com/mes23.html#link

April 16, 2003: Major General Thompson (CG-TACOM) reluctantly supports a 60-day window for requisitions for MILITEC-1 through DSCR from Southwest Asia only. http://www.militec1.com/mes14_modif.html

August 21, 2003: Bruce Stout, of Rock Island Arsenal (TACOM-RI), sends Ernest Jeniolionis at DSCR a high priority directive to stop filling Army requisitions for MILITEC-1 immediately. Since DSCR’s computers could not differentiate between orders, Homeland Security and Coast Guard orders were also cancelled. http://www.militec1.com/mildocs/GilPerkins2.html

October 14, 2003: At the verbal direction of ARDEC, Militec, Inc. received a one-sentence email message from Ernest Jeniolionis at DSCR, stating, “Sir, as directed by the Army, effective immediately DSCR will begin processing all requisitions under the following NSN’s…”   http://www.militec1.com/firearms/nsns.html

November 19, 2003: DSCR updates Congress on the status of our NSN’s. http://www.militec1.com/mildocs/Lyden.html

June 10, 2004: Militec, Inc. receives a Gold Metal Award from the Commanders of DLA and DSCR for perfect compliance in 2003.  With our NSN’s being blocked from our troops for six months and the cancellation of dozens of emergency war orders we still managed to receive a perfect score for best value.  http://www.militec1.com/mildocs/gold_medal.html

July 26, 2004: The Honorable Walter B. Jones, U.S. House of Representatives, receives a letter from Michael Wynne, Undersecretary of Defense, stating, “This letter responds to your June 23, 2004, inquiry to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.” The demand for MILITEC-1 has “exceeded DSCR’s expectations”. http://www.militec.com/mildocs/07_26_04.html

December 9, 2004: Militec, Inc. receives an email from a GS-15, Gus Liggon, DSCR, stating Militec, Inc.’s ID/IQ long-term packaging contract is on track and has been initiated for 5 NSN’s (FSC9150). Estimated solicitation date is Dec. 23, 2004, closing date Jan 24, 2005 and award date March 30, 2005. (Enclosure 1)

Between October 2003 and April 2005, DSCR receives approximately 1600 orders through our exclusive NSN’s, which result in shipment by DSCR of 12,000 cases of MILITEC-1 to our troops. DSCR and Militec have supplied over 1 million bottles of MILITEC-1 to our troops since 2001. This demand for a special-request lubricant is unprecedented. http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/data_pull_p1.html

June 6, 2005: Militec, Inc. receives an email from Patrick Finegan at DSCR, saying the over-due MILITEC-1 solicitation SP0406-05-R-0995 has been cancelled. (Enclosure 2)

June 21, 2005:  Militec, Inc receives its only contract in the past six months from DSCR. This contract requires labeling on all MILITEC-1 boxes that state, [MILITEC-1 is] “NOT APPROVED BY DOD FOR USE AS A SMALL ARMS LUBRICANT. Steve Waylen at ARDEC authorized this inconsistent and confusing language (Enclosure 3)

July 25, 2005: A copy of the second diverted contract requesting MILITEC-1 states: “Not approved by DOD for use as a small arms lubricant”. What ARDEC is telling our troops, you can buy it, but you can’t use it? Troops order MILITEC-1 for their weapons, only to receive a different product that can’t be used on their weapons, even though RDECOM classified the substitute for MILITEC-1 as a GPL. (Enclosure 4)

July, 2005: Militec, Inc. sends numerous letters of protest to government officials. (Enclosure 5)

August 15, 2005: Congressman Walter B. Jones sends Donald Rumsfeld a letter that states, “My understanding is that there may be ongoing occurrences of inappropriate and possibly unethical business practices at the Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) located at the Picatinny Army Arsenal, NJ.” (Enclosure 6)

For the following two years, Militec, Inc. has hired numerous lobbyists and consultants in order to get MILITEC-1’s NSN’s reinstated in the supply system.

June 13, 2007: Gen Pace said in his June 13th reply to Rep. Hoyer, “We also feel that having a single lubricant is important, as we cannot afford to have different lubricants for different operation environments”. (Enclosure 7)

Gen Pace just highlighted the problems with CLP. The Army is limiting better products by insisting CLP will do everything out of one bottle. The Army has finally realized that one bottle can’t do everything so they began by (1) updating the CLP spec’s, and (2) recommending that CLP type 1 should not be used for long term storage and (3) a new CLP  product should be created for extreme desert environments. 

The Army told Congress in 2003 that it would develop a CLP type 2 for “extreme desert environments” to replace the existing CLP type 1 that was clogging weapons with sand. This agreement resulted from the aftermath of the Jessica Lynch story and related news coverage concerning weapons jamming from sand sticking to gunmetal.  http://www.militec1.com/pdf/63460IA7.pdf

MG Nadeau said at a recent meeting with you and some Militec folks, that CLP type 2 have been discontinued since Break-Free, Inc changed their formula. Congress should investigate this since CLP #2 was on the QPL for Break Free, Inc and the CLP #2 was supposed to have solved the weapons jamming problems that congress was investigating.

The acquisition plan http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/acquisition_plan_p1.html  clearly states MILITEC-1 has NSN’s classified as a corrosion inhibitor (as first classified in 1993 and then again in 1995) and not solely a General Purpose Lubricant (GPL) as was newly created by RDECOM in 2003. Corrosion inhibitor is also listed on all orders we have received from DSCR for the ½ ounce and 8 ounce sized containers of MILITEC-1.

 RDECOM’s will not acknowledge MILITEC-1s’ classification for its NSN’s as a (1) corrosion inhibitor and (2) a weapons lubricant that were listed in the Federal Supply Class (FSC) 6150 and FSC 9150 respectively. RDECOM is using non-compliance to a General Purpose Lubricant (GPL) specification (that cover thousands of items) to claim MILITEC-1 does not work in a desert environment, because it does not meet the unique laboratory MilSpec requirements of a General Purpose Lubricant.  

Troops order MILITEC-1 for their weapons and not for WD-40 type applications as the RDECOM GPL MilSpec covers.

 The NSN’s created for MILITEC-1 in 1993 was a result of user demand. That was the criteria in 1993 for the issuance of NSN’s by the USG. The Army updated the NSN’s (with congresses help) in 1995 to reflect smaller bottles and limited uses for the product. 

RDECOM incorrectly and purposely classified MILITEC-1 in 2003 as a GPL when the demand for MILITEC-1 was surging. This way, when our supporters retire or move on, civil-servants can say (which they did) that MILITEC-1 does not meet the MilSpec.  

The only thing we are asking is to have the NSN’s that the USG created and assigned for MILITEC-1 in 1993 and again in 1995 be reinstated.

 Rick Feeney has prepared a draft joint-letter from congress to Secretary Gates that is similar to the letter that was successfully used in 1995 (linked above) when the Army pulled the same stunt. I would like your advice with this letter and a path forward if our current efforts fall short with the Army. Hopefully, the new commander of RDECOM will be receptive to new ideas.

BTW, HP White told us last Friday that they no longer prepare weapons for dust chamber testing. We have a call into SWRI to see if they can do the testing. We should also be hearing from DAC shortly concerning their testing program.

I am at your service and thank you for your continued support,



Brad P. Giordani

President




Enclosures (7) will be linked and emailed this afternoon


Monday, May 2, 2011

THE CSM OF AMC DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE RDECOM CDR'S RULE OF CLEANING WEAPONS UP TO EIGHT TIMES PER DAY

I recently wrote about CSM Mellinger (AMC) and how he was unaware that weapons jam, unless a part breaks. CSM Mellinger does not agree with MG Nadeau's claim of clean your weapon eight times per day or it will jam.
This is another valid reason why troops email us for help. AMC says one thing and RDECOM says something different. RDECOM's dangerous mandate is on our site @ http://www.militec-1.com/nadeau/Army_stands_by_CLP.html
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2009 5:26 PM
Subject: CSM MEETING TODAY

Hi Lee,
We had a very good meeting with CSM Jeff Mellenger today. Diana Dawa was also in the meeting as the PAO. The meeting was from 12-1. I left the email book, army reports, some new emails, rebuttal documents to the GAO report and a few other documents. Since Mellenger brought up the GAO report, is why I gave the data dump. 
Russ started the meeting off  with using common sense  for 10 minutes or so and Mellenger would keep defaulting back on the status quo position of MilSpecs.
1. The CSM NEVER heard of guns jamming unless a part broke. I said, what about due to neglect, not cleaning, ect and he said NEVER. He also said he NEVER heard of Militec being requested by anyone.
2. The CSM suggested we go back to ARDEC to challenge them on the low flash point of CLP. When I asked him if a combustible lubricant was a good idea in the desert, he replied by saying essentially, no.   
3. The CSM didn't think the CG of AMC was the person help to fix this since "things have changed around AMC".... since Gen. Kerns. He suggested we go to the DCD since they start the process. 
4. The CSM insisted that no one EVER mentioned a problem with jammed weapons, unless a part broke. He mentioned that if there was a problem that Gen Odero (SP) would have let it be known. When I mentioned the reluctance of troops  to confront MG Nadeau on this subject, he said no one in combat ever heard of Nadeau and essentially his opinion does not matter.
5. The CSM said he only uses lubricant sparingly and sometimes not at all when in the middle east. I produced the lube it 8 times a day document and he brushed it aside and said he only cleans his weapon once a day at most. When I mentioned the over-lubing requirement now because of the APG dust test, he did not have a reply.
6. The CSM dismissed CSM Adams of the Stryker Brigade, and the CSM you refereed. He suggested that the other CSM A did not have the experience, without saying it.
7. I started the meeting off by apologizing about the YOU TUBE email to him. I said I was threatening AMC (specifically Nadeau) and not you. He accepted it and did not argue the context of the email.
8. The CSM mentioned that AMC works for the taxpayer and congress has a role. This could mean that we are getting on their radar screen, or why would they give us an hour, when he has been dodging us for three years?
I was embarrassed for the Army when he kept insisting that he had NEVER heard of a jammed weapon, unless a part broke. He was very nice, allowed us one hour and we even swapped bear stories. I like him! But, a CSM in that position, along with 3 years stationed in Iraq, to claim over and over again that he  NEVER NEVER HEARD OF A JAMMED WEAPON, UNLESS A PART BROKE is unbelievable.
We left on very good terms. He may even like me now. Ok, maybe I'm pushing it a bit.
That's about it until Russ weighs in.
Respectfully,
Brad