Friday, May 20, 2011

WHY WOULD RDECOM CANCEL WAR ORDERS FROM COMMANDERS IN THEATER?

MG Roger Nadeau cancelled MILITEC-1's National Stock Numbers (NSN's) in the spring of 2005 because MILITEC-1 did not meet a combustible (CLP) Milspec. This specification is defective because of the low flash point and little lubricity of the oil-- no secret.  Since the army's gun oil called CLP does not work properly (since its designed to preform 3 functions) no one makes or sells this exacting Milspec. Why does the commercial market place and gun companies refuse to use the army's gun oil? Because it has been proven not to work properly, especially in desert environments.

In my 22 years of being in DC and doing a ton of military and LE shows, I have NEVER heard ANYONE EVER, claim the army's 3 in one oil worked properly. Most folks laugh when you ask them their opinion of the all in one CLP gun oil product. This 3 in one oil was designed for Vietnam type climates and not the exact opposite environment where the gun metal surpasses the flash point of the gun oil.

The army (ARDEC-RDECOM) does not want two products for weapons maintenance. For this reason, the army created a single product that is designed to preform three functions. (1) It is supposed to clean, is one reason for the low flash point. (2) It is supposed to lubricate. When you have solvents designed to clean the weapon, the cleaning additives lower the flash point. (3) It is also supposed to preserve. The army recently changed its positions to short term instead of long term preservation.

The army still calls the product CLP even though is does not work (preserve) pass 30 days. Interestedly, the army fails MILITEC-1 because it does not pass salt fog lab testing. CLP passes the salt fog test, however, causes weapons to rust in the short term. The CLP product does not preserve, does not lubricate well (is why the army went with a CLP type 2) and the cleaning takes to long since the deposits cement to the gun metal.

The army's 3 in one oil is defective and the managers of this specifications should be held accountable since weapons should not jam for no good reason. This is why MILITEC-1 is in constant demand. Picatinny will argue that MILITEC-1 is only requested because it's free. Really? CO's XO's and NCO's are ordering MILITEC-1 using  government computers and ordering a product that is NOT authorized; all because it's free? Really? Whomever believes this, with all due respect, is an idiot, for not giving our warfighers more credit for what is being applied to their most important piece of hardware.

DoD can be transformed very easily by allowing competition for commodities/other and by allowing the troops to use computers  to order the gear they need prior to reaching the war zone. Militec Inc is doing this right now and it works! DoD needs to allow different manufactures for the same item to compete for business and let the users decide what works best for them in their unique environment. This also prevents one favored contracting firm from gaining all the business, that may not be the best in the long run due to several factors that keep the DoD hamstrung. When Militec Inc is allowed to compete for military business, the demand for the army's 3 in one oil drys up, weapons do not jam and the folks waiting around for disasters to occur can pack up and go home since the problem is fixed. This is why MG Nadeau blocked our NSN's so he can maintain the staus quo with a combustible gun oil which . When everything works, this upsets the status quo and ensures the revolving door stays greased.

DoD must understand that one-shoe does not fit all any more and the one-shoe mentality allows thousands of folks to get paid that are not needed. We have a model to follow that is a win-win for the troops and for the tax payer. Why is the military treated so different that other federal LE agencies when it comes to acquiring basic gear  for a mission? Our forces are spread out and are smaller is why the one-shoe mentality does not fill all any more.

Tens of billions can be saved promptly by, (1) allowing open competition and (2) allowing troops to order all of their gear online with several approved choices.

----- Original Message -----
From: Brad P. Giordani
To: Padgett, Michael G COL [AMSTA-AR-CC]
Cc: COL. Michael J. Smith ; Frank Puzycki ; Goetz, Joseph Andrew P.E. [AMSTA-AR-WET] ; Gus Liggon ; Hays Parks ; Jeniolionis, Ernest (DSCR) ; Joel Goldman ; Kevin Hayes ; Leonard Trahan, Jr. Director Defense Hotline ; LT.COL. Robert Carpenter ; Perkins, Gil (DSCR) ; Richard Audette ; Russ Logan ; Smith, James LTC PM SOLDIER ; Spiers, Dana W. (DSCR) ; Virginia Ezell
Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2003 9:58 PM
Subject: Statement of the Facts
For Immediate Release
Overview
On March 19, 2003, without justification, the Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) reversed a standing eight-year-old directive by the Under Secretary of Defense, which allowed MILITEC-1, a Synthetic weapons oil to be requisitioned by all U.S. forces and federal agencies. This reversal was a collaborative act, done in concert, and at the direction, of Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. (ARDEC).
Militec, Inc. submits four allegations stemming from this act:
First, That Picatinny Arsenal did not have the proper authority to direct DSCR to block our National Stock Numbers (NSNs). Further, DSCR knowingly followed the ill-advised directive by ARDEC with the full knowledge that their parent agency, Defense Logistics Agency, (DLA) implemented the original directive from the Under Secretary of Defense.
Second, that DSCR and ARDEC followed a pattern and practice of unprofessional conduct in managing the supply of a critical product requested by combat forces in theater and by forces preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. We contend that the policy reversal was not the result of a logical, orderly decision-making process by the parties involved, but rather was done as retribution for an eight-year-old grudge held by certain civilians within DSCR and ARDEC.
Third, that this action not only damaged the reputation of our small company and caused us grievous financial damage (several hundred thousand and counting), but also directly contributed to the death and injury of military personnel that were denied access to MILITEC-1 as a safe alternative to the Army’s twenty-three-year-old Military Specification (MilSpec) CLP weapons oil/solvent.
Fourth, that in spite of Militec’s, advisories and warnings to DSCR, ARDEC, TACOM and the DOD IG of the dangers of using MilSpec CLP weapons oil/solvent in desert operations, no action has been taken. Furthermore, official After-Action Reports from Iraq supporting our claims have also been dismissed and MilSpec CLP weapons oil/solvent is still being issued to troops in Iraq.
We strongly urge a swift and thorough investigation into these allegations, not only to redress the damage done, but most importantly to prevent additional injury and loss of life to our military forces.
Background
MILITEC-1 Metal Conditioner is a synthetic weapons oil that allows weapons to be fired dry without attracting sand and dust in desert environments. In contrast, the Army’s mandated MilSpec weapons oil (called “CLP” because of its “all-in-one” action as a Cleaner Lubricant and Preservative) traps sand and debris like a magnet. In the blowing dust and sand of a desert environment, gunmetal quickly becomes coated with a thick sludge, rendering weapons inoperative. For desert operations, MilSpec all-in-one weapons oil has been proven to be defective by deployed forces, federal agencies and many weapon manufacturers.
MILITEC-1 has been used by military activities in every conflict since Desert Storm. The Secret Service, State Department worldwide, FBI, INS, NCIS, DIA, DCIS, USPI, USPP, Sky Marshals, Coast Guard, Capitol Hill Police and many other federal agencies, including our Special Operation Teams in theater, currently use MILITEC-1.
Concerning the First Allegation: July 29, 1995 the Under Secretary of Defense for Materiel Distribution and Management notified Congress that MILITEC-1 would be made available to all military activities, including federal agencies. On the September 18, 1995 DLA implemented the Secretary of Defenses’ direction. However, eight years later Gil Perkins and Ernst Jeniolionis of DSCR did not obtain the required authorization from the Secretary of Defense’s office prior to canceling our war orders and blocking MILITEC-1’s NSNs. Furthermore, DSCR officials followed the direction of Picatinny Arsenal with full knowledge that our NSNs were authorized by the Under Secretary of Defense and the implementation of our NSNs, by their parent agency, Defense Logistics Agency, (DLA). To this day, no one at the Army Materiel Command, (AMC), DSCR, or ARDEC can give us an answer concerning who had the authority to cancel the directive from the Under Secretary of Defense that had been in effect since 1995.
Concerning the Second Allegation: July 2, 1993, MILITEC-1 was granted National Stock Numbers (NSNs) by DSCR. However, beginning in 1994, certain civilians within the Army tried to cancel our lawfully issued NSNs. As a result, on March 17, 1995, nineteen members of Congress sent the Secretary of Defense a joint letter supporting MILITEC-1 to ensure that supplies of MILITEC-1 would be made available to both DOD and non-DOD agencies. Seven months later, additional NSNs were granted and MILITEC-1 enjoyed a continuous, successful and problem-free history of delivery to our forces worldwide through DSCR for eight full years. Even our staunchest critic, Maurice LePera, the former DOD Executive Agent for Fuels and Lubricants, was in full agreement that MILITEC-1 could be used for weapon applications only.
Then, in March 2003, Militec, Inc. received initial orders worth over $100,000 from DSCR. These orders were somewhat larger than historical orders had been, but as our forces were massing to invade Iraq, we did not consider them out of the ordinary and were excited to comply. We were also informed to be prepared for additional large orders, and were told by Dana W. Spiers of DSCR that the “approval for these orders had division backing,” which we knew. We immediately packaged $120,000 worth of specific sizes of MILITEC-1 in anticipation of the promised orders from DSCR.
However, the day after notifying us that our orders had division backing, DSCR summarily cancelled all orders for MILITEC-1. No explanation was given. The field commanders who placed the orders were neither notified by DSCR or ARDEC, nor given an explanation as to why their war orders had been cancelled. Homeland Security orders were also cancelled without explanation. Further, the parties ordering MILITEC-1 were given no opportunity to request that their orders be reinstated, until after the war was declared over. We have requested the customer list and other information from Gil Perkins at DSCR without success. Perkins has promised us answers through several email exchanges, but has yet to deliver, and was recently transferred to another department within DSCR.
The root cause behind these cancellations was that the individuals who initially tried to exclude MILITEC-1 from the supply system in 1994 had been outraged that Militec, Inc. had gone over their heads when help was obtained from Congress. When the current large war orders for MILITEC-1 started rolling in, their smoldering grudge against Militec, Inc. caused them to ignore the standing eight-year-old directive. They simply could not tolerate seeing Militec, Inc. succeed in their system. In a later phone conversation, Ernest Jeniolionis from DSCR informed Russ Logan of Militec, Inc. that the orders had been cancelled on his authority. Jeniolionis said he remembered when Congress had intervened on our behalf eight years earlier, and the current large volume of orders presented a perfect opportunity to “get even.” He also stated that he had not been working alone in this decision. Although these actions may have made Jeniolionis and his comrades excited to see us suffer, this was nothing more than a spiteful act that constituted an historical pattern and practice of unprofessional conduct.
Concerning the Third Allegation: Unfortunately, the desire to hurt Militec, Inc. financially and to damage our reputation was not the only result of the canceled war orders. We firmly believe and have strong evidence to prove that military personnel have been injured and killed as a direct result of being denied access to MILITEC-1, or other products, as a safe alternative to the mandated MilSpec CLP all-in-one oil/solvent.
As an example, the 507th maintenance company was using MilSpec CLP oil/solvent on their weapons when their position was overrun. The fact that all their weapons quickly jammed, making them unable to properly return enemy fire, has been thoroughly reported both in the media and by the military. If those troops had been allowed to use MILITEC-1 instead of MilSpec CLP oil/solvent, their weapons would have functioned properly, and injury, death and capture might have been avoided.
Thus, the soldiers in the field are the ones who paid the ultimate price because a few individuals at DSCR and ARDEC abused their authority in an attempt to further punish our small company.
Concerning the Fourth Allegation: Militec, Inc. has repeatedly advised Ernest Jeniolionis of DSCR, Col. Padgett of ARDEC, Major General Thompson of TACOM and Leonard Trahan the DOD IG Hotline director that MilSpec CLP oil/solvent is a defective product for desert combat operations. Our advisories included warnings from U.S. Government Contractors based in Kuwait (MPRI), who cited years of field experience training U.S. forces for desert combat operations, and also direct intelligence concerning injury and death to our forces. All evidence was ignored, including the compelling account of the dead Navy Seal whose jammed weapon was later found after his position was over-run by Taliban and Al-Queda forces in Afghanistan.
We anticipated decisive action to restore our forces’ free access to MILITEC-1 and to punish the individuals who had abused their authority by following the historical pattern and practice of unprofessional conduct in managing the supply and authorization of critical requisitioned war orders.
Instead, MG Thompson refused to listen. In spite of the fact that to this day weapons continue to malfunction in the Iraqi and Afghani theaters, no direct, immediate action has been taken to alleviate the problem. MG Thompson continues to view our evidence as “masquerading as a serious proposal” and mistakenly believes that MilSpec CLP oil/solvent represents “State-of-the-Art Technology.”
We were extremely frustrated because the agencies we notified were the ones tasked with the responsibility of insuring the safety of our forces. Finally, realizing the responsible individuals were not going to act, we made their refusals public by posting their emails and letters on our website (www.militec-1.com). When they realized we had allowed the world to see their obfuscation, their retaliation, bad-mouthing our product and blocking our orders, have further harmed our forces and prevented our company from being awarded its rightful government contracts that we have worked for since 1988.
As Militec, Inc., of Waldorf, Md., has exhausted its options for definitive action within the appropriate military channels; we will now advise Congress to authorize a prompt investigation and hearings into a pattern and practice of unprofessional conduct at DSCR, TACOM and ARDEC.
Recent developments with Defense Supply Center Richmond and Picatinny Arsenal:
September 17, 2003: Bradley P. Giordani, President of Militec, Inc., sent a draft of a pending Congressional press release to Colonel Michael Padgett of Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. (Enclosure 1)
September 18, 2003: Colonel Padgett responded, stating, “Brad, Recommend we meet to discuss. Someone from the government side will contact you in the next few days to set it up, probably in the DC area. The storm is slowing down our ability to fully coordinate the proposed meeting and contact you with our recommendations. Please give it a few days...” (Enclosure 2)
A copy of the draft press release and Colonel Padgett’s response of September 18 were forwarded by email to Alan Roth, Ph.D., a long-time MILITEC-1 distributor and minority shareholder in Militec, Inc.
Militec, Inc. requested that Dr. Roth approach his friend, General Kern, Commander of AMC, to see if Kern’s office might want to coordinate the meeting with Col. Padgett, as Padgett is part of Kern’s subordinate command at Picatinny Arsenal.
September 22, 2003: Dr. Roth met with Lew Ashley, executive assistant to General Kern and Ombudsman for AMC. Ashley started an investigation after receiving the pending press release and supporting documentation from Dr. Roth, and called Mr. Giordani at home on five separate occasions.
Initially, Ashley asked for a couple of weeks to set up the meeting. Ashley specifically requested that Militec, Inc. hold off going to Congress with the press release since he felt an agreement could be reached that would satisfy both parties. Militec, Inc. agreed.
However, after several more phone calls between Giordani and Ashley, both parties agreed that a meeting would not be necessary after all, as the matter could be resolved from Ashley’s office.
October 14, 2003: Militec, Inc. received a one-sentence email message from Ernest Jeniolionis, Chief, Commodity Service Section JDTA at Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR), stating, “Sir, as directed by the Army, effective immediately DSCR will begin processing all requisitions under the following NSNs: 9150-01-378-3058, 9150-01-378-3118, 9150-01-415-9112, 9150-01-415-9114, 9150-01-415-9111.” (Enclosure 3)
That evening at 5:45 PM, Lew Ashley phoned Mr. Giordani at home to ask if Giordani had heard anything concerning his efforts. Giordani told Ashley about the one-sentence email message from DSCR reinstating the NSNs, though three NSNs were missing that had originally been granted on September 18, 1995. Ashley explained those three NSNs had been cancelled because the Army did not want NSNs for MILITEC-1 the larger size containers. Giordani agreed to this position as a good faith gesture.
Giordani also informed Ashley that Militec had cleaned up its website, however, all of the Army content had not been removed, but rather was hidden until good faith was properly demonstrated. Ashley said thank you, and “please do not send any more nasty grams to Congress”.
In a subsequent conversation, Giordani asked Ashley for a copy of the complete text of the Army’s directive to DSCR. Giordani felt this was a straightforward request, as he hoped it would state the facts and clarify exactly what the one-sentence email message meant. Giordani merely asked Ashley for a letter detailing the Army’s directive to DSCR. Giordani indicated that even a letter identical to the one-sentence email message Militec, Inc. received from DSCR would be acceptable. Since Picatinny Arsenal directed DSCR to process all requisitions for MILITEC-1, Giordani felt the Army could and should go on record reflecting that new agreement.
Ashley was very reluctant to help with the letter. He said the email from DSCR was enough and suggested Militec, Inc. post the message on its website (which had already been done). Giordani said again that the letter could be a verbatim copy of the one-sentence email message from DSCR. Ashley wanted to know why the letter was needed. Giordani explained that a letter was necessary to keep Picatinny honest and to insure that the new deal was in fact what the one-sentence email message inferred. Also, one of the other reasons for the letter would be to allow Militec, Inc. to prove to our forces that the NSN issue had been properly resolved, and their future orders would not be cancelled.
Ashley further explained that the NSNs for MILITEC-1 might only be reinstated for a few months, since Picatinny was currently engaging in “independent tests” of various weapons lubricants. These tests would not only include mere laboratory testing, but would also include actual live-fire testing under supposed real-world conditions. If MILITEC-1 did not fare well in these “independent” lab tests, the NSNs might have to be withdrawn again, and Militec, Inc. would be forced to accept that possibility.
Giordani stressed again to Ashley that the only way to properly test a weapons lubricant is in the field over an extended period of time. The lab testing, which MILITEC-1 has already completed, supports the health hazards and chemical and physical properties. However, Picatinny has continued to fail MILITEC-1 based on a 1960-era salt-fog MilSpec test that does not correlate with field conditions, and has proven to be worthless in real-world circumstances. To support our claims concerning this out-dated Military Specification, Militec, Inc.’s federal customer list is attached. (Enclosure 4)
Ashley’s reluctance to allow DSCR’s one-sentence email to be put into writing makes it apparent to Militec, Inc. that the recent reinstatement of the MILITEC-1’s NSNs is merely a ploy, deliberately planned to keep Congress off the Army’s back while Picatinny devises additional inappropriate lab tests designed to show MILITEC-1 in a negative light. These prejudicial results will then be put in an official report contrasting MILITEC-1’s shortcomings with other products and companies that have been blessed by Picatinny.
Furthermore, what the one-sentence DSCR message really means is that troops may be able to requisition MILITEC-1, but Picatinny has not approved it for use on weapons. In other words, in effect Picatinny is saying, you can buy it, but you shouldn’t use it!
October 15, 2003: Mr. Giordani sent Lew Ashley an email through Dr. Roth highlighting the reasons why a letter from the Army to Militec, Inc. is required. Confirming the Army’s directive to DSCR will put Militec, Inc. on a level playing field. (Enclosure 5)
October 17, 2003: Militec, Inc. received an email from Dr. Roth describing the reasons why Lew Ashley and certain staff at AMC believes a letter to Militec, Inc. is not in the Army’s best interest. (Enclosure 6)
October 17, 2003: Militec, Inc. sent an email message to Colonel Padgett and Kevin Hayes at Picatinny requesting help with the needed Army letter. (Enclosure 7)
Our allegations of unprofessional conduct are supported by the following facts:
1. July 2, 1993: MILITEC-1 products were first granted National Stock Numbers (NSNs) by DSCR. (Enclosure 8)
2. June 6, 1994: MILITEC-1’s NSNs were blocked with the Army’s help. (Enclosure 9)
3. March 17, 1995: Nineteen members of Congress sent a joint letter to Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry that stated, “the Defense Department will approve continued listings of MILITEC-1 in the Defense Supply Catalogue for use in DOD as a weapons lubricant and for machine shop applications, and will process all requisitions and orders from DOD and non-DOD agencies (emphasis added).” (Enclosure 10)
4. June 29, 1995: The Under Secretary of Defense sent Congress a letter stating, “Thank you for your letter of May 18, 1995, to Secretary Perry concerning MILITEC-1. I am pleased to inform you that the Defense Logistics Agency is in the process of establishing two new National Stock Numbers for the one-ounce and four ounce containers of MILITEC-1, for weapons grade and machine shop applications respectively. These two products will be made available to all activities within the Federal Government. The Defense Logistics Agency will advise MILITEC of the National Stock Number assignments when they occur (emphasis added).” (Enclosure 11)
5. September 18, 1995: MILITEC-1 was granted seven NSNs through DLA. (Enclosure 12)
6. For eight full years, MILITEC-1 was supplied to DSCR and Army units without a problem.
7. March 19, 2003: MILITEC-1’s NSNs were cancelled by direction of Colonel Padgett at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. Colonel Padgett also directed DSCR to cancel over $120,000.00 in war orders bound for Iraq without notifying the Commanders in theater. (Enclosure 13)
8. April 4, 2003: Militec, Inc. sent a letter to Major General Ross N. Thompson. (Enclosure 14)
9. April 16, 2003: Colonel Padgett and Major General Ross N. Thompson (CG-TACOM) support a 60-day window for requisitions originating only in Southwest Asia through DSCR. (Enclosure 15)
10. May 15, 2003: MG. Thompson’s responded to Militec, Inc.’s letter of April 4 with a document filled with errors, innuendos and misleading facts. (Enclosure 16)
11. May 15, 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom PEO Lessons Learned, commissioned by General Kern (MG Thompson’s boss), was made public. An excerpt from the report stated: “Lubricant: Soldiers provided consistent comments that CLP was not a good choice for weapons maintenance in this environment. The sand is a fine as talcum powder here. The CLP attracted the sand to the weapon. Soldiers considered a product called Militec to be a much better solution for lubricating individual and crew-served weapons.” (Enclosure 17)
12. June 1, 2003: Militec, Inc. sent a letter to MG. Thompson highlighting his many errors and misleading statements. MG. Thompson did not reply. (Enclosure 18)
13. August 21 2003: Colonel Padgett again allowed DSCR to cancel MILITEC-1’s NSNs. This cancellation was implemented in spite of After-Action Reports from Iraq which support the benefits of MILITEC-1 in combat by our troops. (Enclosure 19)
14. October 14, 2003: MILITEC-1’s NSNs were temporarily reinstated again in a one-sentence email at the direction of Colonel Padgett to Ernst Jeniolionis. (Enclosure 20)
There can only be two reasons why Militec, Inc. is being singled out and treated in such an unprofessional manner (a) Certain individuals are incompetent. (b) Those same individuals have a hidden agenda.
The Army must grant MILITEC-1 a MilSpec, or clarify in writing that MILITEC-1 is approved for weapons use and include MILITEC-1 in the Army Log so the troops can order without fear or retribution.
In summary, not only is the Army unwilling to enforce or address the Under Secretary of Defense’s directive of June 29, 1995, they will not even issue a letter repeating the same one-sentence text that Militec received from DSCR at the Army’s direction.
The reason is clear: If such a simple letter became part of the public record, it would be very difficult for Picatinny Arsenal, NJ to cancel MILITEC-1’s NSNs again. Also, and not withstanding all the evidence contained in this document, Picatinny’s new position, that troops can buy MILITEC-1 but it is not approved for use, exemplifies and proves a pattern and practice of unprofessional conduct.
Note: Militec, Inc. must promptly see a letter of good faith and must be treated fairly in the future.
Militec, Inc. will once again allow the system an opportunity to correct itself before this document is released to all printed and electronic media, and is tirelessly lobbied before both Houses of Congress with all the force Militec, Inc. can bring to bear.
October 19, 2003 DRAFT
Release date October 23, 2003
.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

THE ARMY'S GUN OIL CALLED CLP DOES NOT WORK PROPERLY AND Why Are Folks Hired That Are Not Needed?

 The email (below-2 days ago) is a perfect example what happens to weapons when the army's three in one combustible lubricant is used.
The manager of the 149 degree minimum flash point specification should be jailed. It does not take a rocket scientist to realize that an oil with a 149 degree flash point should not be used on weapons where the ambient temps on the gun metal will surpass the flash point of the gun oil.
THE PICATINNY ARSENAL MOB DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT A WEAPON IS ONLY AS EFFECTIVE AS THE APPLIED LUBRICANT.
This is why tanks and planes use synthetic oils because of temperature extremes. For the army to mandate a combustible oil for all military weapons world wide is criminal. So instead of locking folks up, weapons are jamming and the do-nothing mob in NJ is in constant demand because the guns do not work properly... all because of a defective oil that keeps many employed because of the constant problems.This is why no one makes or sells the army's 3 in one oil. Normally military technology is state of the art and everyone wants to use the technology. Then why did the original manufacturer of the governments oil stop making it? Answer, because it was proven in OEF/OIF not to work properly and all of the reports confirm this. So the army's answer is to now OVER LUBE weapons in a desert environment. Why was this change made after 15 years? Because of one indoor test that demonstrated over lubing with an artificial sand was more effective that under lubing. So why would the army adopt this new procedure. when the reports have disclaimers? Answer, to maintain the status quo, which is a danger since nothing changes and the rascals stay in power, even though they are not needed.
----- Original Message -----
From: "xxxxx" <xxxx.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 11:01 AM
Subject: 1stBN 5thMAR Advisor Team in Afghanistan

> Hello my name is Sgt xxxx
>     I'm in Sangin Afghanistan advising and patroling with the Afghan
> National Army. We're danger low on CLP, plus the stuff we do have just
> attracts the dust and turns to sludge. We have 20 guys total, we'll
> take whatever you can afford to give!
>
> MAIL TO:
>
> Sgt xxx
> 1/5 H&S Co. Advisor Team
> UNIT 40315 FPO AP xxxx
>
>
> -Thanks for the support!
>
> Sgt xxxx
> SEMPER FI
>

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

WHY CAN'T THOUSANDS OF SCIENTISTS DEVELOP PRODUCTS?

 The army pays thousands of scientist (and others) big bucks to develop needed gear for the warfighters. Then why for the past ten years has their been no significant advances in gear? Why does the army pay scientists when they don't invent anything? Is it because the scientists may have a breakthrough in the future?
Why does the army spends billions on programs at Picatinny Arsenal in NJ? Picatinny did develop the Picatinny rail for guns. What else has Picatinny developed that reached the warfighter in the past 10 years? If Picatinny was run for profit, the based would be shuttered since they is nothing to show.
If the army would embrace competition, they would not have to rely on their own people whom (most) place their careers above the needs of the warfighter. Over half of deployed troops are not issued all of the basic supplies prior to their departure.PEO Soldier and Picatinny should be held to account. Why does Picatinny support a 149 degree flashpoint lubricant (called CLP) for world-wide military operations? Answer, because they can and will not admit (by changing spec) that jammed weapons are responsible for dead troops.
If PEO Soldier worked as it was supposed too, MILITEC-1 would not be in constant demand by Soldiers and the army's combustible gun oil would not be jamming weapons in sustained gun fights.  The army has created a bureaucracy that feeds off itself and is unable to address the immediate needs of soldiers going into combat.
Since the system is designed by default to defend itself, most troops will continue to go into battle without the proper supplies needed, until fair and honest competition is allowed. The military civilians maintain their power by controlling and/or elininating competition through various in house programs.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bradley P. Giordani" <militec@militec-1.com>
To: "Allen D Westheimer" <WestheimerA@gao.gov>; "Colin L Chambers" <ChambersC@GAO.GOV>; "Oscar W Mardis" <MardisO@GAO.GOV>; "Marilyn K Wasleski" <WasleskiM@GAO.GOV>
Cc: "lee kind" <lee.kind@militec.com>; "Richard Feeney" <Rick1655@aol.com>; "Russ Logan" <militec@militec-1.com>
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2008 2:43 PM
Subject: THE PROBLEM WITHIN THE ARMY

>I found an article (on body armor) in Defense review @
> http://www.defensereview.com/article828.html that I believe highlights a
> similar problem we have with the system.
>
> Pasted below(from the link above), is a paragraph that highlights the
> problems (we are having) at Picatinny Arsenal, JSSAP and AMC.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> The problem is that the best current small arms solutions are being actively
> blocked by DoD/U.S. Army elements that control the small arms
> procurement/adoption system. This system is broken and corrupt. Elements
> within U.S. Army Materiel Command, and Picatinny Arsenal/JSSAP appear to be
> more concerned with their own careers and survival than the lives/survival
> of our infantry warfighters (our guys on the ground doing the actual
> fighting). The current small arms development and procurement/adoption
> system isn't just broken. It's terminally broken, and needs to be completely
> overhauled. To DefenseReview's knowledge, Picatinny Arsenal/JSSAP hasn't
> developed and successfully fielded a single infantry small arm since
> Picatinny took over military small arms procurement/adoption after the old
> Springfield Armory (U.S. Army, not private company currently operating in
> Illinois) was rased to the ground over 40 years ago. Picatinny Arsenal/JSSAP
> unfortunately hasn't proven itself to be any more effective than the old
> Springfield Armory, and our infantry warfighters are suffering for it.
> Unfortunately, like any organism, the current system will fight tooth and
> nail to defend itself in order to live on. But, make no mistake, it needs to
> be killed, just like the old Springfield Armory (U.S. Army's Springfield
> Armory, not the current private company in Illinois) before it.
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I hope this article helps !
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Brad P. Giordani
> http://www.militec-1.com/
>
>

Thursday, May 5, 2011

CORPORATE CONTROL OVER THE ARMY

 
----- Original Message -----
Cc: 
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2008 9:40 AM
Subject: CORPORATE CONTROL OVER THE ARMY

1. Its been a long standing tradition for the Association of the US Army (AUSA) ("the voice of the soldier") to  hire only  former Commanding General's of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) to be the President of the AUSA.
 
2. The corporate contractors rely on AUSA to get their word out to  Army buyers. AUSA lobbies Congress on behalf of Army issues. 
 
3. The Corporate control  AUSA  has over AMC is cemented by their hiring of  Commanding General's fresh out of AMC.
 
4. This is why AMC fights tooth-and-nail over any competition that does not originate through AMC channels.
 
5. This is also why the Cleaner Lubricant and Preservative (CLP) weapons lubricant has not had any competition (except for us briefly)  since it was developed twenty-eight years ago.
 
We are fighting this issue with all of our might because CLP does not work in desert combat environments and AMC cannot admit after twenty-eight years that this program has been a failure.  Next to food and water there is nothing more important for combat troops than to have weapons that work first time and every time. This is a National Security Issue.
 
We have been attacked by MG. Roger A. Nadeau for exposing a defective product that AMC still considers to this day to be state-of-the-art in lubrication performance.
 
We cannot keep supplying the entire Military without our NSN's being valid in the supply system.
 
We are deeply in debt and hope that some oversight can help us stay in business.
 
Sincerely,
 
Brad P. Giordani
 
 
 

WE ARE HOPEFUL THE NEW CHAIRMAN WILL INVESTIGATE ABUSE

 
----- Original Message -----
Cc: 
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 11:36 AM
Subject: BACKGROUND INFO

11828 Pika Drive, Waldorf, Maryland 20602 USA
Phone (301) 893-3910   Fax: (301) 893-8354

May 3, 2007



Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your demonstrated interest in questionable government procurement policies and in bureaucratic irregularities and misconduct leads us to believe that you will share our concerns about an agency within the U.S. Army and the effect of its actions.

At issue is whether American troops in the field should be permitted to procure and use a weapons lubricant of their choice – be mindful that properly functioning weapons are literally our troops’ lifelines.

The Army asserts adamantly that its approved product is the “perfect” lubricant, but the troops overwhelmingly, aggressively, reject it.  Ironically, the troops’ lubricant of choice – MILITEC-1 – is mandated for use by almost all other federal agencies, including the Secret Service, Coast Guard, Capitol Police, Park Police, and many more.

The Army developed its lubricant – CLP (Cleaner, Lubricant, and Preservative) – in 1980, and has upgraded the specifications and formula many times in an attempt to get it to work.  Any weapons lubricant must conform to the Military Specification (MilSpec) for CLP in order to be approved by the Army.

The problem lies in the fact that the MilSpec for CLP calls for a “wet” lubricant that functions by keeping a liquid film of oil on metal surfaces at all times.  In the Iraqi and Afghan deserts, this spells disaster, because the oil film attracts dust and sand, forming a sludge that renders weapons inoperable.  It also promotes a build-up of carbon and metal particles that result from firing the weapons.

In contrast, MILITEC-1 is a “dry” lubricant – synthetic oil that actually becomes a part of metal surfaces instead of covering them with a liquid film.  It allows a dry, fully lubricated, corrosion- resistant weapon to operate without attracting sand and dust, or attracting even the usual carbon and metallic debris created by firing the weapon.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, weapons lubricated with MILITEC-1 continue to fire in conditions that quickly jam a weapon lubricated with CLP.



We have thousands of unsolicited emails and personal testimonials – far more than mere “anecdotal evidence” – from troops in Iraq and throughout the world who ridicule CLP, while attesting to the life-saving properties of MILITEC-1.

From 2002 through 2005, Militec, Inc. filled four million dollars worth of orders and reorders for product to military field units, through the Defense logistics Agency (DLA).  However, in 2005, the Army precipitously cancelled the National Stock Numbers assigned to MILITEC-1, preventing further DLA fulfillment of orders from the field.  This cancellation has also prevented DLA fulfillment of orders for MILITEC-1 from other government agencies such as Secret Service, Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard.

Now, when field units order MILITEC-1, they are shipped CLP instead – the same CLP the units were trying to avoid because they consider it dangerous to use.

Let us be clear: MILITEC-1 will not conform to a MilSpec.  It does not function as the Army’s MilSpec-defined CLP.  To argue how well MILITEC-1 meets or does not meet a MilSpec is specious, and only distracts from the key issue:  that the dry lubricant, MILITEC-1, functions very well in the field, and the Army-approved wet lubricant, CLP, does not.

Mr. Chairman, the history of this issue has generated controversy and disagreement, but the stakes today are too high to coddle bruised egos.  Army MilSpec defenders can’t be allowed simply to say, “We’re right because we’re right,” while troops in the field, from privates through senior NCO’s to general officers, say, “They’re wrong!” ... not when the price of error can be lethal.

Our troops deserve the right to procure and use a weapons lubricant that their hard experience has shown them will work, where CLP does not.  And their morale is diminished when they see their judgment based on experience is ignored.  Therefore, in addition to the MILITEC-1delivered to military units through DLA, this company has, since 2001, shipped directly to individual troops and units more than 329,000 bottles of MILITEC-1.  We do not accept any payment for these shipments, not from the troops or their families, and we absorb the cost of shipment through the Postal Service and UPS.

The issue of allowing field units to choose MILITEC-1 carries an extensive paper trail extending more than 15 years.  Militec, Inc., has maintained that paper trail very carefully; we invite you and your staff to examine it.  We believe you will find astounding degrees to which certain elements in the Army have gone to prevent field units from obtaining what their experience has shown to be the superior weapons lubricant.

If you will give us the time for a careful, studied review, we believe you will see an issue easily valid enough to rise to the level of your committee’s attention.

Sincerely,



Richard J. Feeney
Vice President for Public Affairs

Why the Army Cannot Modernize Quickly

 The Army must understand that one show does not fit all as it may have in Vietnam.
----- Original Message -----
Cc: 
Sent: Monday, October 06, 2008 12:47 PM
Subject: THIS WAS PROVIDED TO HASC OVER THE SUMMER

        Why the Army Cannot Modernize Quickly

·        Before being procured by the Army, every piece of hardware fielded to Soldiers goes through seven distinct development stages, all controlled by statute and regulation.
·        These stages of development are not transparent.  The machinations performed by Army staff, even if not classified, are largely hidden.  Therefore, if contractors and other interested parties are to stay current with the development process, they must build solid relationships with each of the bureaucrats who are in charge of the seven different stages of development.  This multi-tiered system ensures that Army-developed products are protected from cradle to grave. Industrial and commercially approved products are not given a chance to compete in DoD commodity markets.
·        Early in the development cycle, the “customers” are officers within the Joint Chiefs of Staff who vet each weapon system to ensure the requirement is valid.  Later, the combat developer agencies are seen as the customers.  Then the materiel developer community becomes the customer.  Eventually, the soldier is the end-user.  This multi-tiered system, with changing personalities of the many decision makers, makes it difficult for companies to compete for any Army business when civil servants must protect their jobs at all cost. 
·        Since Vietnam, nearly all Army equipment has been replaced with more modern equipment, incrementally better items except -- most importantly -- small arms, third in importance to the soldier, behind water and rations. The Joint Services Small Arms Program (JSSAP) manages all small arms programs for the DoD. For their 20 plus year existence, JSSAP has never put in the hands of warfighters any new weapon systems.
Well-intended, but Inadequate “Fixes”
·        Commercial off the Self (COTS) products are used by the General Service Administration and other federal agencies, except for the military.  Why? The military uses its own people to develop and implement new products, instead of buying off the self. Commodities should be competitively bid.
·        The Defense Streamlining Acquisition Act was signed into Law in 1995, but still has not been implemented.  The Act was written to take advantage of COTS, and to encourage Commanders to think outside the strict MilSpec conformance box when general supplies are needed quickly.

Therefore, the Department of Defense has not followed the intent of Congress, nor the statute.  Congress must hold the Department of Defense accountable to both the spirit and the letter of the Defense Streamlining Acquisition Act.

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON MILITEC-1 DISCOUNTED AND TWO EMAILS FROM TODAY

The document was sent to the House Armmed Services Committee. Unfortunetly, Jesse Tolleson was not able to help. Jesse had the solution when he asked the army if a small bottle of MILITEC-1 could be madce available along with the army's CLP if units wanted to ordered it. The army's position is one bottle of the same product for all environments. The army has failed to realize that the minimum flash point for CLP is 149 degree F, which is extremely dangerous to use in hot environments. Weapons reach temteratures far beyond that of the CLP flashpoint. The other point the army fails to understand is a weapon is ONLY as effective as the applied lubricant. This is why tanks and jets use synthetic oils. A lubricant (army's own CLP) with a 149 degree specification should NEVER be used in a desert environment 

This is one of seveal reasons why the troops email us for help. Below, I  posted two emails from today:
   
From: XX, JXX M 1SG MIL USA USA B Co 1-201 USAxxxx [mailto:xxx.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2011 8:47 AM
To: militec@militec1.com
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO] deployed request for your product

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

I am the Company 1SG of a group currently deployed overseas. I have approx. 40 Soldiers currently in my location. Weapons, we have what I would call a “Standard Combat Load” as any Infantry Company would. I am requesting some of your product to distribute and utilize on our various platforms. As so many others before me have stated and as you know, MILTEC-1 hands down wins “the hearts and minds” of every Joe that has ever used it! Keep up the GREAT work! The support you give us is appreciated. To lighten the load on shipping and it helps with the OPSEC of the mission. If you can send it to my home (address below),. My wife sends packages to me about every other week with various supplies. Thanks again!

v/r

 1SGXXX

TF 1-201 Bravo Company First Sergeant


Mailing address, stateside

 XX Oh. XX
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2)-----Original Message-----
From: xxxx L SSG MIL USA USA XXX
[mailto:xxxxkuwait.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2011 8:08 AM
To: militec@militec1.com
Subject: militec for troops
Gentlemen,
I was overlooking the offer for free MILITEC for troops.  I have a total of 208 weapons systems from crew serves to personal weapons that I would like the dry lubricant for.  I think it is really awesome that your company does this for US Military personnel.  You can ship it to the shipping address below.  Thank you for your support.
 XX
SSG, FA, XXARNG
Supply NCO

TF 201st xx
xxx
Camp xxx, Kuwait
APO AE xxx
                                                                    

To: Jesse Tolleson, via email

From: Brad P. Giordani

SUBJ: Timeline document governing proper authority

Date June 25, 2007


This document will highlight the approvals and classifications for MILITEC-1’s National Stock Numbers (NSN’s) in the early nineties and how they were blocked 10 years later by RDECOM without obtaining the proper authority from the office at OSD which issued the directive back in 1995 for the issuance of additional NSN’s for MILITEC-1.

The NSN approvals of 1995 were a result of Congress and OSD reaching agreement on limiting the use of MILITEC-1 for weapons and machine shop applications. The Army’s former executive agent for fuels and lubes (Mr. LePera) even agreed on these two applications for MILITEC-1 which resulted in thousands of requisitions thru DSCR @ http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/data_pull_p1.html.

 The cancellation of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s and contracts began in earnest by ARDEC when both Commanders of RDECOM and AMC retired at the end of 2004. This campaign to rid MILITEC-1 from the system was done (1) despite the existing and daily demand for MILITEC-1 at DSCR, (2) pending ID/IQ five-year contract, and (3) over three million dollars that were rushed ordered by the Army in less than two years. DSCR finalized the acquisition plan http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/acquisition_plan_p1.html for a five-year ID/IQ contract award in February 2005.

Militec, Inc. contends that ARDEC, TACOM and RDECOM did not have the proper authority to block MILITEC-1 orders from Afghanistan and Iraq which circumvented the ten-year old 1995 agreement Congress had with OSD without complaint.

                                                                                      Timeline

 August 23, 1993: MILITEC-1 products are first granted five National Stock Numbers (NSN’s) by Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR), formerly DGSC. http://www.militec1.com/1nsn1.html

June 29, 1994: Memo titled “Specifications and Standards - A new way of doing business” is sent by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to his Under Secretaries. This became law in 1995, and Brad attended the Rose garden Ceremony.  http://www.militec1.com/NewWay1.html

August 26, 1994: Acting DSCR commander advises Militec, Inc. that removal of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s is in the Government’s best interest.  http://www.militec1.com/Lotts.html

October 31, 1994: Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), the parent agency of DSCR, advises Militec, Inc. that “all requisitions have been cancelled.” http://www.militec1.com/Lippert2.html

December 6, 1994: DLA advises Congress MILITEC-1’s NSN’s cancellation order as been suspended. http://www.militec.com/Montgomery2.html

March 17, 1995: Nineteen members of Congress send a joint letter to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry supporting MILITEC-1. http://www.militec1.com/Congress1.html

March 24, 1995: DLA advises Militec, Inc. that it will not cancel the NSN’s. http://www.militec1.com/Montgomery4.html

June 29, 1995: The Under Secretary of Defense sends Congress a letter stating, “Thank you for your letter of May 18, 1995, to Secretary Perry concerning MILITEC-l. I am pleased to inform you...” http://www.militec1.com/NSN1.html

July 6, 1995: DLA notifies Congress that two new National Stock Numbers (NSN’s) will be granted to MILITEC-1. http://www.militec1.com/FrankTejeda.html

September 18, 1995: MILITEC-1 is granted two additional NSN’s for a total of seven NSN’s through DLA. http://www.militec1.com/willfinkel1.html

For eight years, using our sole-sourced NSN’s, MILITEC-1 is continuously supplied to the Defense Supply Centers and Military units worldwide without a problem.

March 19, 2003: While our troops are rolling into Baghdad, MILITEC-1’s NSN’s are abruptly blocked by direction of Colonel Padgett at Picatinny Arsenal N.J (ARDEC). Colonel Padgett’s group also directs DSCR to cancel over $120,000.00 in emergency war orders for MILITEC-1, without notifying the Commanders of all three Brigades of the 3rd ID that were arriving in theater. http://www.militec1.com/mes23.html#link

April 16, 2003: Major General Thompson (CG-TACOM) reluctantly supports a 60-day window for requisitions for MILITEC-1 through DSCR from Southwest Asia only. http://www.militec1.com/mes14_modif.html

August 21, 2003: Bruce Stout, of Rock Island Arsenal (TACOM-RI), sends Ernest Jeniolionis at DSCR a high priority directive to stop filling Army requisitions for MILITEC-1 immediately. Since DSCR’s computers could not differentiate between orders, Homeland Security and Coast Guard orders were also cancelled. http://www.militec1.com/mildocs/GilPerkins2.html

October 14, 2003: At the verbal direction of ARDEC, Militec, Inc. received a one-sentence email message from Ernest Jeniolionis at DSCR, stating, “Sir, as directed by the Army, effective immediately DSCR will begin processing all requisitions under the following NSN’s…”   http://www.militec1.com/firearms/nsns.html

November 19, 2003: DSCR updates Congress on the status of our NSN’s. http://www.militec1.com/mildocs/Lyden.html

June 10, 2004: Militec, Inc. receives a Gold Metal Award from the Commanders of DLA and DSCR for perfect compliance in 2003.  With our NSN’s being blocked from our troops for six months and the cancellation of dozens of emergency war orders we still managed to receive a perfect score for best value.  http://www.militec1.com/mildocs/gold_medal.html

July 26, 2004: The Honorable Walter B. Jones, U.S. House of Representatives, receives a letter from Michael Wynne, Undersecretary of Defense, stating, “This letter responds to your June 23, 2004, inquiry to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.” The demand for MILITEC-1 has “exceeded DSCR’s expectations”. http://www.militec.com/mildocs/07_26_04.html

December 9, 2004: Militec, Inc. receives an email from a GS-15, Gus Liggon, DSCR, stating Militec, Inc.’s ID/IQ long-term packaging contract is on track and has been initiated for 5 NSN’s (FSC9150). Estimated solicitation date is Dec. 23, 2004, closing date Jan 24, 2005 and award date March 30, 2005. (Enclosure 1)

Between October 2003 and April 2005, DSCR receives approximately 1600 orders through our exclusive NSN’s, which result in shipment by DSCR of 12,000 cases of MILITEC-1 to our troops. DSCR and Militec have supplied over 1 million bottles of MILITEC-1 to our troops since 2001. This demand for a special-request lubricant is unprecedented. http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/data_pull_p1.html

June 6, 2005: Militec, Inc. receives an email from Patrick Finegan at DSCR, saying the over-due MILITEC-1 solicitation SP0406-05-R-0995 has been cancelled. (Enclosure 2)

June 21, 2005:  Militec, Inc receives its only contract in the past six months from DSCR. This contract requires labeling on all MILITEC-1 boxes that state, [MILITEC-1 is] “NOT APPROVED BY DOD FOR USE AS A SMALL ARMS LUBRICANT. Steve Waylen at ARDEC authorized this inconsistent and confusing language (Enclosure 3)

July 25, 2005: A copy of the second diverted contract requesting MILITEC-1 states: “Not approved by DOD for use as a small arms lubricant”. What ARDEC is telling our troops, you can buy it, but you can’t use it? Troops order MILITEC-1 for their weapons, only to receive a different product that can’t be used on their weapons, even though RDECOM classified the substitute for MILITEC-1 as a GPL. (Enclosure 4)

July, 2005: Militec, Inc. sends numerous letters of protest to government officials. (Enclosure 5)

August 15, 2005: Congressman Walter B. Jones sends Donald Rumsfeld a letter that states, “My understanding is that there may be ongoing occurrences of inappropriate and possibly unethical business practices at the Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) located at the Picatinny Army Arsenal, NJ.” (Enclosure 6)

For the following two years, Militec, Inc. has hired numerous lobbyists and consultants in order to get MILITEC-1’s NSN’s reinstated in the supply system.

June 13, 2007: Gen Pace said in his June 13th reply to Rep. Hoyer, “We also feel that having a single lubricant is important, as we cannot afford to have different lubricants for different operation environments”. (Enclosure 7)

Gen Pace just highlighted the problems with CLP. The Army is limiting better products by insisting CLP will do everything out of one bottle. The Army has finally realized that one bottle can’t do everything so they began by (1) updating the CLP spec’s, and (2) recommending that CLP type 1 should not be used for long term storage and (3) a new CLP  product should be created for extreme desert environments. 

The Army told Congress in 2003 that it would develop a CLP type 2 for “extreme desert environments” to replace the existing CLP type 1 that was clogging weapons with sand. This agreement resulted from the aftermath of the Jessica Lynch story and related news coverage concerning weapons jamming from sand sticking to gunmetal.  http://www.militec1.com/pdf/63460IA7.pdf

MG Nadeau said at a recent meeting with you and some Militec folks, that CLP type 2 have been discontinued since Break-Free, Inc changed their formula. Congress should investigate this since CLP #2 was on the QPL for Break Free, Inc and the CLP #2 was supposed to have solved the weapons jamming problems that congress was investigating.

The acquisition plan http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/acquisition_plan_p1.html  clearly states MILITEC-1 has NSN’s classified as a corrosion inhibitor (as first classified in 1993 and then again in 1995) and not solely a General Purpose Lubricant (GPL) as was newly created by RDECOM in 2003. Corrosion inhibitor is also listed on all orders we have received from DSCR for the ½ ounce and 8 ounce sized containers of MILITEC-1.

 RDECOM’s will not acknowledge MILITEC-1s’ classification for its NSN’s as a (1) corrosion inhibitor and (2) a weapons lubricant that were listed in the Federal Supply Class (FSC) 6150 and FSC 9150 respectively. RDECOM is using non-compliance to a General Purpose Lubricant (GPL) specification (that cover thousands of items) to claim MILITEC-1 does not work in a desert environment, because it does not meet the unique laboratory MilSpec requirements of a General Purpose Lubricant.  

Troops order MILITEC-1 for their weapons and not for WD-40 type applications as the RDECOM GPL MilSpec covers.

 The NSN’s created for MILITEC-1 in 1993 was a result of user demand. That was the criteria in 1993 for the issuance of NSN’s by the USG. The Army updated the NSN’s (with congresses help) in 1995 to reflect smaller bottles and limited uses for the product. 

RDECOM incorrectly and purposely classified MILITEC-1 in 2003 as a GPL when the demand for MILITEC-1 was surging. This way, when our supporters retire or move on, civil-servants can say (which they did) that MILITEC-1 does not meet the MilSpec.  

The only thing we are asking is to have the NSN’s that the USG created and assigned for MILITEC-1 in 1993 and again in 1995 be reinstated.

 Rick Feeney has prepared a draft joint-letter from congress to Secretary Gates that is similar to the letter that was successfully used in 1995 (linked above) when the Army pulled the same stunt. I would like your advice with this letter and a path forward if our current efforts fall short with the Army. Hopefully, the new commander of RDECOM will be receptive to new ideas.

BTW, HP White told us last Friday that they no longer prepare weapons for dust chamber testing. We have a call into SWRI to see if they can do the testing. We should also be hearing from DAC shortly concerning their testing program.

I am at your service and thank you for your continued support,



Brad P. Giordani

President




Enclosures (7) will be linked and emailed this afternoon